**LEVENT KOÇKESEN**

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**EDUCATION**

1999 Ph.D. Economics **New York University**

1994 M.A. Economics **New School For Social Research**

1987 B.Sc. Economics **Middle East Technical University**

**FIELDS OF INTERESTS**

Game Theory, Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory

**HONORS & AWARDS**

1998-1999 Alfred P. Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship

1998-1999 Dean’s Dissertation Fellowship, New York University

1990-1993 Prize Fellowship, New School For Social Research

2012, 2013 Excellence in Teaching, Koç University

**PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE**

2007-Present Associate Professor, Koç University, Department of Economics

2005-2007 Assistant Professor, Koç University, Department of Economics

2005-2005 Associate Professor, Columbia University, Department of Economics

1999-2005 Assistant Professor, Columbia University, Department of Economics

**PUBLICATIONS**

1. “The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence.” (with S. Ertac and D. Ozdemir), Games and Economic Behavior (2016), 100, 24-45.
2. “Commitment without Reputation: Renegotiation-Proof Contracts under

Asymmetric Information,” (with E. Gerratana), Review of Economic Design

(2015), 19, 173-209.

1. “Litigation and Settlement under Judicial Agency,” (with M. Usman), International

Review of Law and Economics (2012), 32, 300-308.

1. “Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts,” (with E.

Gerratana), The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances) (2012), 12:1.=

1. “Relative Income Hypothesis,” inWilliamA. Darity (Ed.), International Encyclopedia

of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition (2008)

1. “Bargaining and Exclusivity in a Borrower-Lender Relationship,” (with S.

Özerturk), Review of Economic Design (2007), 11, 53-68.

1. “Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments,” Economic Theory (2007), 31,

539-552.

1. “Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts,” (with E. A. Ok),

Review of Economic Studies (2004), 71, 397-424.

1. “The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences,” (with

E. A. Ok and R. Sethi), Journal of Economic Theory (2000), 92, 274-299.

1. “Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games,” (with E. A.

Ok and R. Sethi), Games and Economic Behavior (2000), 31, 303-310.

1. “Negatively Interdependent Preferences,” (with E. A. Ok), Social Choice and

Welfare (2000), 17, 533-558.

1. “Popular Support for Progressive Taxation in the Presence of Interdependent

Preferences,” (with T. Mitra and E. A. Ok), Economics Letters (1998), 58, 69-76.

**GRANTS AND PROJECTS**

2014-2015 TUBITAK, “Sequential Debate and Information Aggregation”

2013-2014 TUBITAK, “Strategic Communication and Governance when the Preferences

of the Decision Maker is Uncertain” (Principal Investigator)

2011 TUBITAK, “Litigation and Settlement under Judicial Agency”

2010-2011 TUBITAK, “Communication and Delegation with Externalities” (Principal

Investigator)

2004-2005 Columbia University, The Program for Economic Research

2000-2001 Columbia University, The Humanities and Social Science Council

**GRADUATE STUDENT SUPERVISION**

**Ph.D. Thesis Advisor:** Shahin Baghirov (ongoing), Elif Kubilay (Koç, 2016: Post-doc at Bocconi).

**Ph.D. Thesis Committee Member :** Alp Atakan (Columbia), Francisco Ciocchini (Columbia), Jennifer Lamping(Columbia), Gea Lee (Columbia), Dilek Caner (NYU), Zeynep Turgay (Koç,2012), Ahmed Timoumi (Koç, 2015).

**M.A. Thesis Advisor:** Ramazan Bora (Koç, 2010), Fatih Demirbas (Koç, 2013), Yagmur Dalman (Koç,2013), Shahin Baghirov (2016).

**M.A. Thesis Committee Member:** Basak Uysal (Koç, 2009), Fatih Tuluk (Koç, 2010), Selcen Çakır (Koç, 2010),Neslihan Sakarya (Koç, 2010), Erhan Aysan (Koç, 2011), Ergun Kotan (Koç, 2012),Arda Gitmez (Koç, 2013), Gokben Aydilek (2015).

mittee, UniCredit & Universities Foundation